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Abstract 
In the May 2014 general elections in India the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) emerged as the 
majority party. The BJP has formed a coalition with regional parties (the National Democratic 
Alliance), but many view the event as a “critical election,” presaging the realignment of 
Indian politics along Hindu nationalist values. This article reviews the approaches used to 
understand the BJP-led NDA government‟s policies towards religious minorities, and argues 
that far from marking a radical departure there are more continuities than discontinuities in 
these policies with previous administrations. 
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Introduction 
The May 2014 Lok Sabha (Lower House) elections marked a major turning point in post 1947 
Indian politics: the Bharatiya Janata Party‟s (BJP) success, which secured 282 of the 336 seats 
won by National Democratic Alliance (NDA) parties, signalled a dramatic defeat of the Indian 
National Congress (hereafter Congress). With 31 percent share of the vote, the BJP became 
the first party with an outright majority since 1984, and formed a coalition government with 
its NDA partners. Narendra Modi, an Other Backward Class (OBC, a socioeconomically 
disadvantaged caste) member, and who had served as Chief Minister of Gujarat during the 
2002 anti Muslim riots, was installed as Prime Minister. Although the BJP‟s victory has been 
attributed to Modi‟s charismatic leadership, and the popularity of his agenda for development 
with India‟s youth, ideologically the party is committed to the promotion of Hindutva 
(primacy of Hindu values) that threatens to undermine the accommodation of religious 
minorities, particularly 180 million Muslims. This outlook is reflected in the party‟s disdain 
for state secularism (that is often described as “pseudo secular” in privileging the interests of 
religious minorities but marginalizing the claims of the majority Hindu population), 
opposition to article 370 of the constitution, which gives special status to Jammu and Kashmir, 
the demand for a Uniform Civil Code − that would abrogate Muslim personal law − and 
commitment to build a temple dedicated to deity Ram at the site of the Babri Masjid in 
Ayodhya (demolished in 1992). In short, the BJP and the Sangh Parivar (its associated 
organizations such as Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), 
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and Bajrang Dal) have the programmatic objective of building a Hindu rashtra (a Hindu 
state).1 
 
Although the BJP‟s manifesto formally acknowledged the need for equality of 
opportunity for all,2  in the last three years its policies on religious minorities – and the actions 
of its associated organizations – have raised concerns about intolerance and discrimination. 
Efforts have been made to reconvert disadvantaged Muslims and Christians to Hinduism; an 
aggressive “cow protection” movement has been launched directed primarily at Muslims and 
lower caste Hindus; anti conversion legislation has been used to undermine religious freedom; 
and there have been notable episodes of violence against religious minorities, especially in 
states with pending elections.3 Traditionally, the BJP and its associated organizations have 
made a distinction between religious minorities for whom India is “not only a fatherland but a 
holyland” (Buddhist, Jains, and Sikhs), and others (Christians and Muslims) whose “holyland” 
is elsewhere.
4
 Accordingly, its ideological approach seeks to assimilate the former within the 
broader pantheon of Hinduism and politically and socially exclude the latter as alien to India. 
But overall these approaches are set within the context of primary of Hindu values: as one 
Cabinet Minister stated after May 2014, “all Indians are Hindus, and there is nothing wrong 
with the term Hindu being applied equally to all citizens.”5  
 
This article has two objectives: to assess the BJP-led NDA government‟s policies on 
religious minorities, and secondly, to reflect more broadly on how the change in policy can be 
conceptualized. Therefore, we examine the argument that BJP‟s victory signals the emergence 
of India‟s “second republic”, or offers a new accommodation for religious minorities. We also 
assess whether the conventional coding of the BJP as an anti system ideological party that is 
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twintracking – seeking to effect a cultural revolution while operating within the framework of 
liberal democracy – offers a more appropriate framework for evaluating the government‟s 
policies and actions. Finally, we assess the merits of historical path dependence that highlights 
the continuities between the BJP and Congress in managing religious diversity in India.  
 
 
The making of a “new republic” 
 
Sanjaya Baru, the ex-media advisor to former Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, is 
adamant that the social and political change that underpinned the BJP‟s electoral success is 
the precursor of India‟s second republic, one that is less beholden to the legacy of colonialism 
and Partition. According to Baru,  
I firmly believe this era with Narendra Modi at the helm is the birth of India‟s 
second republic. Lok Sabha 2014 marked the end of the “Nehruvian” dynasty. 
Our nation‟s first phase of being a republic lasted from 1950 to 2014, the 
second phase has begun and we are yet to see how it will grow and flourish. I 
don‟t see any constitutional changes but the political processes in the country 
have already begun to change.
6
  
 
Although Baru emphasizes the drive towards economic development, the template for this 
“new republic” is being fashioned not by the emergence of a right-of-centre conservatism that 
is promarket, or in tune with India‟s cultural diversity, but the familiar icons of Hindutva. On 
his first day in office, for instance, the Minister of State for the Prime Minister‟s Office, 
Jitendra Singh, announced that the government had already started discussion on the 
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abrogation of article 370 of the constitution. Despite the ensuing controversy, the minister was 
backed by senior BJP leaders, and subsequently he has often repeated his support for the 
repeal of article in public.7 Similarly, on the Ram temple in Ayodhya, Amit Shah, the BJP‟s 
president, has expressed full support for its construction. The issue once gained centre stage in 
Uttar Pradesh (UP) ahead of state elections, being exploited by BJP Members of Parliament 
(MPs) and the Sangh Parivar as a symbol to mobilize support in a state that sends 80 MPs to 
the Indian Parliament. Sakshi Maharaj, a BJP MP from UP, has reasserted the party‟s 
commitment to the temple, declaring that the site is “a spiritual centre for Hindus around the 
world.” 8  Subramanian Swamy, a former Union Minister and member of the Planning 
Commission, has demanded a special meeting of the party to expedite the efforts to build the 
temple before the next general elections, and has filed a petition in the Supreme Court 
requesting the Court‟s intervention. In November 2016, the Minister of Tourism stoked a 
major controversy by announcing his plan to visit Ayodhya for the purpose of inspecting the 
disputed site for building Ramayana museum.9 
  
 The government appears to have adopted a similar approach to the proposals for 
Uniform Civil Code, with the Law Minister supporting its implementation. In October 2016, 
at the government‟s prompting, a questionnaire was submitted by the Law Commission of 
India seeking public consultation on the proposal. The questionnaire was issued on the same 
day the government filed an affidavit in the Supreme Court opposing the Islamic practice of 
triple talaq − which allows a Muslim man to part from his wife by saying or writing the word 
“talaq.” Ostensibly, these changes were portrayed as necessary to implement reforms that 
have already been undertaken in some Islamic countries such as Pakistan and Indonesia. 
However, the manner in which the procedural manoeuvres were effected suggests that the BJP 
is determined to establish a Uniform Civil Code by the “back door” while undermining the 
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autonomy of Muslim Personal Law or its ability to reform itself. The issue has been further 
politicized at the state level following the election of Yogi Adityanath (BJP) as the Chief 
Minister of UP. The party has astutely exploited the differences between the All India Muslim 
Personal Law Board (AIMPLB), which is the custodian of Muslim Personal Law, and the 
victims of triple talaq, ostensibly in the name of promoting modernization.10  
  
Thus, the “new republic,” if it is emerging, threatens to undermine the existing rights 
of some religious minorities. Modi‟s declaration, following attacks on Christian minorities, 
that the constitution is his “holybook,”11 sits uneasily with the BJP‟s and the Sangh Parivar‟s 
interpretation of the constitution that is eroding minority rights such as personal law, or dietary 
practices, and the right to exercise freedom of religion.
12
 At this stage, unlike the previous 
BJP-led NDA government (1998-2004), there has been no proposal for a new constitutional 
commission, but loud voices within the BJP and the wider Sangh Parivar have been calling to 
Indianize the constitution.
13
 Although at times the BJP has needed support from its coalition 
partners, for example in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House), its “core agenda” has remained 
unchanged: Hindutva is the ideology around which Baru‟s “second new republic” is being 
fashioned. 
  
 
A “new zone of consensus” 
 
For some, under the BJP-led NDA, India‟s democracy has entered a new phase, one 
characterized by post Congress governance of minorities. According to Wright, the new 
government epitomizes the dilemma for religious minorities in a multiparty, multiethnic 
democracy where one or more of the “majority parties appear to be hostile to the interests or 
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even survival of the minority group.”14 As in Nazi Germany15 or for the Tamil ethnic minority 
in Sri Lanka, this dilemma requires minorities to radically reassess their strategies vis-à-vis the 
dominant party: that is, whether to oppose or cooperate, to work with united fronts, or 
consolidate minority vote banks. Wright, nonetheless, suggests that Modi‟s and the BJP‟s 
approach is that of a right-of-centre party that offers a “new zone of consensus” which can be 
extended to “incorporate the right wing, as left wing was incorporated much earlier in Kerala 
and West Bengal.” This accommodation, he argues, might be achieved “without the Muslim 
minority having to pay a disastrous price.”16 
 
Since May 2014, the government has made efforts to recognize the cultural identity of 
some religious minorities. In March 2016, a major exhibition exploring the cultural history of 
Zoroastrianism was launched in Delhi, cocurated by School of Oriental and African Studies 
(University of London), the British Library, and UNESCO Parzor (Parsi Zoroastrian Project) 
that was sponsored by the Ministry of Minority Affairs (MoMA) under its scheme Hamari 
Dharohar. The event is significant as the first of its kind funded by MoMA which has been 
criticized as incompetent in its role to make direct engagement with religious minorities. 
Acknowledging the Parsi contribution to India‟s industrialization and educational 
advancement, the Minister of Minority Affairs admitted that “it is time we did something 
before the Parsi community gets lost in the pages of history.” 17  Likewise, following 
expressions of dissatisfaction by its coalition partner, the Shiromani Akali Dal in Punjab, a 
turbaned Sikh (Surendrajeet Singh Ahluwalia, MP from Darjeeling) was inducted into the 
Cabinet, though he is from Bihar.18 Interestingly, accommodation and recognition of cultural 
identity of religious minorities was further extended by granting minority status to Jewish 
community in Maharashtra.19 At the same time fulsome overtures were made on the occasion 
of the 125
th
 anniversary of B.R Ambedkar‟s death to ingratiate the BJP with India‟s large 
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Buddhist population of Dalits who recently have been victims of atrocities committed by 
Hindutva activists. 20  Yet overall, these measures have been largely symbolic, without 
substantive commitment to equality of opportunity for religious minorities or additional 
resources. Most significantly, they have excluded the largest minority in India – Muslims.  
 
Politically, the marginalization of Muslims is evident in the decline in community‟s 
representation in Parliament from 34 (7 percent) in the 14
th
 Lok Sabha (2004), and 30 (6 
percent) in the 15
th 
(2009) to 22 (4 percent) in the 16
th (2014) − the lowest number of Muslim 
MPs since independence.21 Only 7 of the BJP‟s 482 candidates were Muslim, and not one of 
them secured a seat. Parliament has no Muslim MPs from UP or West Bengal, the two states 
with the largest Muslim populations (Census 2011); the only Muslim MPs are from West 
Bengal (eight), Bihar (four), Jammu and Kashmir (four), Kerala (three), Assam (two), Andhra 
Pradesh (one), Tamil Nadu (one), and Lakshadweep (one). Of the 151 ministers in the 9 BJP-
ruled states, only one is Muslim. Remarkably, this contrasts with 52 Muslim ministers in 13 
non BJP-ruled states.22  
 
Much more striking has been the rhetoric and policies of the BJP-led NDA government 
towards Muslims and Christians. According to Najma Akbarali Heptulla, the former Minister 
of Minority Affairs, “Muslims are not minorities. Parsis are.”23 For her, Muslims‟ concerns 
about security arise primarily out of a “fear psychosis” that has gripped the community.24 She 
also supported the BJP line which opposes affirmative action provisions for Dalit Christians 
and Muslims on the grounds that they are unconstitutional. Thawar Chand Gehlot, a Dalit, and 
the Minister for Social Justice and Empowerment, has also opposed this demand because, 
according to him, backward communities among all religious groups are covered under the 
OBC category. 25  Sanjay Paswan, secretary of the BJP‟s Scheduled Caste Cell, candidly 
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professed that if poor Muslims and Christians who had converted from Hinduism to these 
faiths “want [the] benefits of reservation, let them get converted back to Hinduism and accept 
ghar wapsi (literally “return home”).”26  
 
In terms of policy, the BJP-led NDA government has steadfastly refused to implement 
the recommendations of the Sachar Committee Report (2006)
27
 that identified a series of 
positive actions targeted at minorities and Muslims in particular to improve the community‟s 
socioeconomic and educational conditions. The findings of the Post Sachar Evaluation 
Committee, established by MoMA during United Progressive Alliance (UPA, 2004-14) 
government to evaluate the implementations of the Sachar Committee Report 
recommendations, have not been tabled for further discussion. Rather, both the Sachar 
Committee Report and the Post Sachar Evaluation Committee‟s findings have been challenged 
for the quality of their analysis and data. Indeed, the framework of equality of opportunity 
promoted by the UPA government which included, among other things, setting up a general 
equal opportunities commission and the inclusion of Dalit Christians and Muslims in the 
reservations for employment and education, as we noted above, has been officially 
disapproved of by Cabinet Ministers on the grounds that these proposals are unconstitutional.  
 
The BJP‟s reluctance to establish “zone of consensus” is further evident in its 
sponsorship of state level ban on cow slaughter, notably in BJP-ruled states, that is often used 
to target minorities (Christians and Muslims) and the lower castes involved in processing cow 
products. During the Haryana elections, for example, the party promised to increase the 
penalty for cow slaughter to life imprisonment. Under pressure from Hindutva activists the 
Himachal Pradesh High Court has directed the central government to consider enacting a law 
prohibiting the slaughtering of cows at the national level. Ironically, the court verdict came to 
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the conclusion on the grounds that “secularism is one of the basic features of the Constitution 
of India [and hence] people should not hurt the religious sentiments of each other.” 28 
Following this judgement, the VHP increased its street level agitation with the demand for 
national level legislation that culminated in the nationwide proliferation of gau raksha (cow 
protection) vigilantes. This agitation climaxed in a de facto national anti cow slaughter 
regulation when the Ministry of Environment invoked the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
Act (1960) to issue the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Regulation of Livestock Markets) 
Rules, 2017 with effect from May 23
rd
, 2017. This regulation bans the sale and purchase of 
cattle, including cows and buffalos, for slaughter at livestock markets.
29
 The regulation has 
been vociferously opposed in the beef-eating states in northeast and the south. However, its 
most serious consequences are likely to be for Muslims who are engaged in the $10 billion 
leather and meat production across India and related industries such as milk production, 
leather goods, and processing of dead animals that give livelihoods to large sections of the 
community‟s poor.30 The regulation is more than likely to further embolden the activities of 
gau raksha vigilantes who have unleashed a reign of terror against traders and consumers of 
beef, leading to high profile incidents such as the tragic death of a poor Muslim man in Dadri 
(UP) in 2015 and the assault on Dalits in Gujarat. In sum, the BJP‟s policy to “reach out to 
poor Muslims” appears to be directly undermined in placating the demands of its Hindutva 
constituency.
31
  
 
Equally noteworthy has been the BJP government‟s silence in face of attacks on 
religious freedom of minorities until the external pressure, principally from the US,
32
 has 
helped rein in the Hindutva activists who have headed the reconversion to Hinduism, known 
as ghar wapsi. The main targets of such campaigns are socioeconomically disadvantaged 
Muslims and Christians, considered by the BJP and its associated organizations as lapsed 
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Hindus. Since May 2014, there has been an intensification of nationwide ghar wapsi 
campaigns by Hindutva organizations. In the words of the VHP leader Pravin Togadia, “the 
whole world was once inhabited by Hindus…and [we] will strive to increase the population,” 
and “our target is to make India a Hindu rashtra by 2021. The Muslims and Christians don‟t 
have any right to stay here.”33 Although no official data is available, the ghar wapsi campaign 
has reconverted at least 200 Christians in Gujarat, 300 Muslims in Agra, and more than 100 
Christians in Kerala.34 There are also claims that these activists have reconverted Christians to 
Sikhism in Punjab, but these were denied by Sikh organizations. 35  Sometimes such 
conversions have been encouraged by government officials with threats to cancel the Below 
Poverty Line cards, a vital resource that grants poor Muslims and Christians access to 
government welfare schemes. Ghar wapsi was somewhat reined in following concerns 
expressed by US lawmakers, 36  a message strongly reinforced during President Barack 
Obama‟s visit to India in January 2015 (see below). However, despite this moderation, calls 
for a national anti conversion legislation in the guise of freedom of religion act remain strong 
within the BJP and its associated organizations. Support for this measure has also been 
strongly expressed by the Union Home Minister.37  
 
Yet more striking are incidents of hate speech and communal violence against 
Christians and Muslims since 2014. According to data cited in Parliament, there were 751 
incidents of riot in 2015 against 644 in 2014, with an increase in the number of casualties from 
95 dead and 1,921 injured in 2014, to 97 dead and 2,264 injured in 2015. Of the states that 
erupted most frequently into violence, communal incidents have been reported in UP (155) 
and Karnataka (105), ruled by the Samajwadi Party (until March 2017) and Congress 
respectively, but Maharashtra (105), Madhya Pradesh (92), Rajasthan (65), and Gujarat (55) –
all have BJP governments. Bihar has experienced 71 incidents (an increase from 61 in 2014), 
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and West Bengal has seen a 100 percent increase in the number of communal incidents (16 in 
2014, 32 in 2015).38 Unsurprisingly, riots have been concentrated in states with substantial 
Muslim minorities – UP and Maharashtra – or where elections are scheduled.39 At the same 
time, the victims of such communal incidents, more often than not, Christians and Muslims, 
have suffered further due to inaction or complicity by the state and police, as seen during the 
Hindu-Muslim clashes and attacks against Christians in Delhi in 2014-15.40 
 
 
Twintracking: from a minority anti system party to a majority anti system party 
 
Like the main communist parties of India (Communist Party of India (Marxist) and 
Communist Party of India), the BJP (and its predecessors) are often viewed as anti system 
parties that pursue an ideological revolution with cadre-based associated organizations (RSS, 
VHP, Sangh Parivar).
41
 Such parties function in two political zones: the party‟s ideological 
frame of reference and the constraints of the Indian political system – constitutional and 
political – that it seeks to transform. Resembling the Indian communist and Euro-communist 
parties that have functioned in liberal democracies, the party, it is argued, “twintracks” to 
build the conditions for its success in order to effect a political revolution. Whilst the 
Hindutva-centric electoral agenda has enabled the BJP to consolidate the Hindu vote, once in 
government, historically the BJP has moderated its ideological stance. Thus, after the 
difficulties faced by the first Janata Party coalition government (1977-79), the BJP‟s 
predecessor, the Jan Sangh, sought to better manage risks in a coalition government. This 
strategy has enabled subsequent BJP-led coalition governments to function without 
substantially compromising their Hindu ideology. A comprehensive review of the BJP-led 
NDA government (1998-2004) argues that minority interests were accommodated “with a 
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demonstrably Hindu bias rather than the dissolution of their distinctive identities.”42 This was 
achieved by placing the contentious issues of the BJP‟s ideological agenda – abrogation of 
article 370, a Uniform Civil Code and the construction of a Hindu temple in Ayodhya – on the 
backburner while state power was used liberally to promote cultural nationalism. Thus, that 
government is remembered for its strident efforts to Hinduize the school and university 
curricula, promote anti cow slaughter legislation in the states, and encourage the passing of 
“freedom of religion” legislation which in fact limited the capacity to convert.43 At the same 
time executive power was used to pack prestigious institutions, such as the Indian Council for 
Historical Research and the National Council for Educational Research and Training, with 
Hindutva ideologues; and despite being a minority party in broader coalition, the BJP national 
leadership was able to absorb the serious shock of the anti Muslim pogroms in Gujarat in 
which 2,000 Muslims were killed and further 150,000 displaced.44 
  
However, May 2014 transformed the BJP from a minority anti system party to a 
majority anti system party, albeit one that does not command the overwhelming majority to 
reshape the constitution in its image. As a result, this has vastly extended state patronage to the 
Sangh Parivar to further the Hindutva agenda while being at arm‟s length from the 
government, and better resourced and organized to undertake such activities.
45
 These resources 
have been strategically deployed ahead of state elections: the ghar wapsi campaigns, for 
instance, were launched before the state elections in Haryana, Maharashtra and Jharkhand, in 
each of which the party was able to form governments. In the highly prized state of UP, where 
state elections took place in 2017, the Hindutva organizations have been implicated in 
fomenting communal violence, while BJP ministers have provided strong symbolic support 
for the construction of temple in Ayodhya46 and for the families of those accused in the Dadri 
beef eating case.47 Following the appointment of Yogi Adityanath, a founder of the Hindu 
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Yuva Vahini – a militant Hindu youth organization which has been often involved in 
communal incidents – as a new Chief Minister of UP, a clear message was sent to the 
supporters of majoritarian Hinduism within the BJP and much more broadly. Not surprisingly, 
under Adityanath‟s government, there have been political moves to divide Muslims over triple 
talaq and rein in the development policies of the previous Samajwadi Party government aimed 
at religious minorities.
48
 Indeed, under the current BJP government, there appears to be open 
collusion between the state and forces of Hindutva. While the programme of promoting 
cultural nationalism has been further extended from schools to colleges and universities, the 
RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat‟s annual address to his organization was broadcast live on the state 
tv network Doordarshan. 49  Following the “surgical strike” against Pakistani supported 
militants across the Line of Control in Kashmir, moreover, the armed forces have also been 
used to inculcate nationalism and patriotic virtue against what are viewed as anti national and 
seditious tendencies.50 In short, the cultural nationalist agenda of the Modi government is less 
constrained than the previous minority BJP-led NDA governments, with close cooperation 
between government and the BJP‟s associated organizations. This perhaps better explains the 
unfolding nature of the organized political and street level confrontations between the BJP and 
its opponents, including minority religious groups.  
 
Arguably the twintrack approach – of working towards a cultural revolution while 
operating within the constraints of the existing political system – is also apparent in the 
ambivalent rhetoric of Modi. Professions of tolerance of religious diversity and harmony have 
been accompanied by studied silence in the face of “inflammatory provocations from the 
Hindu Right.”51 Only when public criticism of silence has become deafening, has Modi been 
moved to offer a fulsome declaration of his commitment to religious diversity. Thus, it was 
following the attacks on churches in Delhi that in a highly symbolic move Modi conceded that 
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“my government will give equal respect to all religions and will not allow any form of 
violence against any religion.” “We consider,” he further added, “the freedom to have, to 
retain, and to adopt, a religion or belief is a personal choice of a citizen.”52 A similar approach 
was deployed when the US President Barack Obama expressed concerns about religious 
intolerance during his visit in January 2015, and reemphasized this at the National Prayer 
Breakfast in Washington DC.53 In response, Modi symbolically chose a function hosted by a 
Christian group to state that: 
 
My government will not allow any religious group, belonging to the majority or 
the minority, to incite hatred against others, overtly or covertly…We cannot 
accept violence against any religion on any pretext and I strongly condemn such 
violence. My government will act strongly in this regard. With this commitment, 
I appeal to all religious groups to act with restraint, mutual respect, and 
tolerance in the true spirit of this ancient nation which is manifest in our 
Constitution and is in line with the Hague Declaration.
54
  
  
In another statement in the Lok Sabha in the wake of communal attacks against Christians and 
Muslims, Modi stated that “my government‟s only religion is „India first‟” and “the only 
religious book is „Indian Constitution,‟ our only prayer is „welfare of all‟.”55 Such after-the-
event melodramatic rhetoric was also evident in the aftermath of violence by cow protection 
vigilantes against Dalits in Gujarat. The incident, which has the huge potential to undermine 
the BJP‟s Dalit votebank, brought forth the plea from the Prime Minister that “attack me, 
shoot me if you want, but don‟t attack Dalits.”56 Although Modi has shown some contrition as 
a result of these acts, and has named some welfare schemes after Christian and Muslim 
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icons,57 the sincerity of the Prime Minister‟s statements continues to lack strong conviction 
among large sections of India‟s religious minorities. 
  
The twintrack approach is not without its dilemmas. The promotion of Hindutva, even 
for elections, also requires that the party insulates its leadership from more vitriolic rhetoric of 
second rung leadership that rarely conceals its disdain for minorities. The dividing line 
between senior leadership and right wing activism is both thin and permeable: for instance, 
Giriraj Singh, who in the run-up to the 2014 general elections called Modi‟s critics to be “sent 
to Pakistan,” was subsequently appointed to a ministerial position. He continues to make 
inflammatory speeches targeting particular religious communities, most recently stating that 
minority religious groups should have no more than two children, in order to “keep [Hindu] 
daughters safe.” 58  Even if this rhetoric can be tempered, the substantive issue remains: 
religious minorities, especially Christians and Muslims, have voted with their feet against the 
dominant ruling party in India and remain unconvinced of its public pronouncement to 
promote and protect India‟s rich tradition of religious pluralism.59 
 
 
Historical institutionalism and path dependence: towards an alternative understanding 
of Modi and minorities 
 
The approaches to the BJP-led NDA government‟s policies on religious minorities that we 
have examined so far all fall short in significant measure. The journalistic offerings of Baru, 
for example, provide few insights into the political processes that are in making the “second 
republic” which, in any case with its market orientation, is likely to undermine the provision 
of public goods that can benefit disadvantaged religious minorities. Similarly, the prima facie 
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conditions for a centre-right political party à la BJP to accommodate religious minorities seem 
to have been undermined by that party itself in its relentless drive towards hegemony in the 
Indian political system. Ideological accounts centred on the BJP also suffer from 
overemphasis on the distinction between Congress‟ secular nationalism and the BJP‟s Hindu 
nationalism: they overlook the essential interchangeability between the two species which 
have nestled within Congress since preindependence.
60
 Doubtless the BJP‟s policies and 
actions towards some religious minorities since 2014 are more strident, confrontational and 
overt, but arguably the difference in approach towards religious minorities between the 
Congress and the BJP is not one of kind but of degree because the long period of 
postindependence governance under the Congress was also marked by periodic outbursts of 
high level communal violence against minorities and secular decline in the socioeconomic 
status of the largest minority. The rise of the BJP, which has been facilitated by the alignment 
of main cultural force in Indian society (Hinduism) with political power, is not unconnected 
with institutional structures established at Independence that have created a “caste-iron” 
democracy.61 
 
Historical institutionalism and path dependence enables us to make better sense of why 
all Indian governments have struggled to develop effective policies for religious minorities. 
The framework of rights established for religious minorities at Independence continues to 
limit government – whether Congress or BJP – policymaking for religious minorities, 
especially Muslims. Historical institutionalism is concerned with “how political struggles are 
mediated by the institutional setting in which [they] take place.”62 Inevitably, the approach 
takes the “weight of the past” at the centre of analysis and political actors as agents of history 
operating within a framework of institutions. The historical institutionalist approach suggests 
that new institutional arrangements created during “critical junctures” can have a longterm 
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impact by creating a path that can become selfreinforcing and reproducing through a positive 
“feedback loop”, or “increasing returns.”63 Once the institutions are established, it creates a 
particular path and once viable option can become increasingly remote with switching cost 
increasing further down to the path.
64
 Therefore, institutions become “locked in” in a 
particular path, resulting in what is called “institutional stasis.” 65  In this process, the 
importance of “critical juncture” cannot be overemphasized because this is the time that those 
in power, using their political authority, can institutionalize their advantage and impose their 
preference on less powerful actors. As an attempt at changing “rules of the game”, who owns 
political authority at the time of “critical juncture” will determine the nature and direction of 
public policies – “the main mechanism for institutionalizing advantage” – and the outcome is 
imposed on the less powerful with no “viable exit option.”66 If the outcome of decision is the 
particular constitutional provisions, for instance, it will work in a way to “durably advantaging 
particular actors by creating supermajority requirements for revision.”67 Therefore, more often 
than not, another “critical juncture” is required for a radical policy change.68 
 
In this sense, the constitution-making process in India (1946-49) is not only an ideal 
exemplar of a critical juncture but a good case of institutional stickiness by design because the 
amendment process requires consensus from majorities who have a built-in bias against 
change.
69
 Thus, Kim70 has argued that the distinction between caste and religion established at 
independence in the provision of reservations for socioeconomically disadvantaged castes has 
“locked in” a form of path dependence that has led to the increasing expansion of policies of 
compensatory reservations for Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs) and OBCs. At 
the same time, disadvantaged religious minorities, principally Dalit Christians and Muslims, 
have become relatively marginalized because they have struggled to overcome the institutional 
resistance to inclusion in the category of backward classes. Such institutional resistance can 
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also be found in the effective provision of public sector service delivery and basic security for 
some religious minorities, particularly Christians and Muslims.
71
 
 
In the period from the 1980s to the 2000s, some religious minorities (Christians, 
Muslims and Sikhs) mobilized to challenge the constitutional framework of minority rights 
limited to religious and cultural spheres. However, the attempt to create a new “critical 
juncture” through political mobilization by these minorities instead provoked a counter 
response from the forces of Hindutva, reinforcing the cleavage defined by caste between the 
“majority” and the “minorities.” 72  The UPA government introduced a number of policy 
initiatives to improve the socioeconomic conditions of disadvantaged Muslims,
73
 which had 
potential to create another “critical juncture,” but most of these measures were not legislated 
upon or remained unimplemented as the government resorted to symbolic and promotional 
policies. During the UPA administration, opposition to policymaking for religious minorities 
came from three constituencies: the institutionalized SC, ST and OBC lobbies that view 
themselves as the guardians of these caste groups‟ interests and considered the extension of 
reservations for Christian and Muslim Dalits as dilution of their rights and institutional 
structures; the civil service and judiciary, which have interpreted minority demands as 
“religious” in a secular state; and the BJP and its Hindutva organizations on the grounds that 
such policies undermined the hegemonic nationalist framework that prioritizes social justice 
primarily directed at socioeconomically disadvantaged Hindu castes. 74  Coincidently, these 
voices were also present within the Congress.75 Although the Congress has traditionally been 
viewed as prominority, as we have seen above, successive Congress governments‟ record in 
addressing the concerns of religious minorities remains highly compromised. This needs to be 
viewed against the background that Hindu majoritarian sentiment was clearly present within 
the Constituent Assembly Debates on minority rights and continued to linger within the 
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Congress.76 Thus, the National Commission for Minorities, which monitors minority rights, 
was established by a non Congress government in 1978. Three years later, when the Congress 
returned to power, Indira Gandhi‟s government discarded the Commission without a formal 
announcement, appointing the Gopal Singh Panel. 77  Subsequently, the Panel‟s report was 
suppressed because its findings were at jar with government‟s view on minorities. Almost 24 
years later this pattern was repeated by the Congress-led UPA government in its reluctance to 
release the report of the National Commission for Religious and Linguistic Minorities (2007) 
− which proposed reservations for Dalit Christians and Muslims − for fear of a political 
backlash. 
 
There is a clear difference in the ideological rhetoric of the Modi government and its 
Congress predecessor on the policies on religious minorities. However, whilst this rhetoric, or 
what Bajpai78 calls “legitimising vocabularies,” are important, the implementation of these 
policies shows demonstrable continuities. These are reflected in the denial of religious 
minority political demands, or challenging some of the claims as “contentious”, or still, 
offering symbolic or rhetorical accommodation. It is also evident in protecting the interests of 
Hindu OBCs, SCs and STs against the extension of affirmative action provisions, or 
opposition to extending the special legislation – against violence, for example – that applies to 
religious minorities such as Christians and Muslims. Most seriously, they are evident in the 
significant gap between the rights and programmes directed at religious minorities and the 
shortfall in implementation. Thus, the BJP-led NDA government has, for example, responded 
promptly to passing the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) 
Amendment Act, 2015 that introduces tough new measures to tackle caste-based atrocities 
against Dalits and strengthens security for SCs and STs. In contrast, no effort has been made 
to provide new legislation to curb communal violence against minorities. The Communal 
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Violence Prevention Bill, for instance, initiated by the UPA, and then described by Modi as 
“ill conceived, poorly drafted and a recipe for disaster,” remains a dead letter. Even the UPA 
only promoted the measure only “up to a point.”79 Equally, the UPA‟s efforts to address the 
minorities‟ “development deficit,” particularly of Muslims, was predicated not on the 
allocation of additional resources but the utilization of existing schemes in various ministries 
that were centralized under MoMA.80 In the same fashion, the BJP-led NDA government has 
neither reduced MoMA‟s overall budget allocation, nor increased it substantially, but rather 
expressed its policy preferences both at the national and state level through implementation, 
where the record varies from virtual non implementation to partial implementation, subject to 
the availability of funds.81 Yet, perhaps the most interesting development, following the UP 
elections, which saw the BJP attract significant support among Dalits, is the attempt to further 
strengthen the pro-poor Hindu caste institutions of affirmative action. This has resulted in the 
proposal to disband the existing National Commission for Backward Classes and replace it 
with National Commission for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes with 
constitutional status. Critics argue the proposal is designed primarily to limit the power of the 
states to determine the list of OBCs for whom reservations can be made. It also opens the way 
to include higher castes who might also be socially and educationally backward.
82
 Overall, 
though at this stage in the government‟s tenure, when it is midway through its term, it is 
difficult to undertake a systematic analysis of the BJP administration‟s policies on religious 
minorities, but the evidence which is emerging suggests that despite the ideological shift to the 
right there are more continuities in the policies with previous governments than radical 
discontinuities defined by the Hindutva agenda. 
 
 
Conclusion 
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The election of the BJP-led NDA government with an overt ethno nationalist Hindutva 
agenda has renewed interest in the management of religious diversity in the world‟s largest 
democracy. This has been further reinforced by the BJP‟s landslide victory in the state 
assembly elections in UP in February-March 2017. As the most populous state in India, the 
victory significantly strengthens the BJP‟s ability to return to power in the national elections 
in 2019 as well as demonstrating the electoral appeal of Hindutva. The BJP‟s policy of 
managing India‟s religious diversity is often contrasted with Congress‟ civic conception of 
nationhood that has tied a secular state with multiculturalism.83 However, the radical critique 
of Indian state secularism which emerged in the 1990s following the demolition of the Babri 
Masjid in Ayodhya (1992) questioned this distinction on the grounds that historically there 
has been significant modularity between the two political traditions that dates from the 
preindependence period.84 This modularity is best reflected in the sharing of the common 
nationalist hegemonic discourse towards religious minorities during India‟s constitution 
making with limited efforts to “accommodate” these minorities which is symbolized in the 
unusual character of Indian state secularism as sarva dharma sambhava (equality respect for 
all religions). We can better understand this continuity today in the emergence of the BJP as 
the party of government.  
 
 These continuities, we have argued, can be better understood if we draw on historical 
institutionalism and path dependence in assessing the BJP-led NDA‟s policies on religious 
minorities. There are clearly significant rhetorical and ideological differences on the subject 
between the BJP-led NDA and its predecessor, Congress-led UPA. However, both have 
struggled to generate appropriate “legitimising vocabularies” that can underpin their 
distinctive approach towards the governance of religious diversity in contemporary India. In 
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this respect, paradoxically the BJP‟s “anti minorityism” and the Congress‟ multicultural 
“inclusivism” have more in common in producing general inertia in this critical area of social 
policy. 
 
  Finally, it needs to be acknowledged that whilst the policy responses of the BJP-led 
NDA government and its associated organizations appear to mark a radical break with the 
traditional governance of religious diversity in India, the post 1966 period of Congress rule 
suggests that its record of violence against religious minorities and toleration of high levels of 
institutional discrimination is not unblemished. Even Dr. Manmohan Singh‟s UPA 
government struggled to control communal riots, and its executive actions to improve 
condition of religious minorities remained largely symbolic.85 Seen in this light, the BJP-led 
NDA‟s policies thus far have been judged primarily on the excesses of Hindutva followers on 
the accession of the BJP to power which have sometimes been marked by gratuitous actions. 
A realistic assessment, however, of how the BJP-led NDA government has so readily adjusted 
to the statecraft of managing India‟s religious diversity without a significant opposition 
remains to be undertaken. Seriously perused, such an assessment would draw on historical 
institutionalism and path dependence to probe why after 70 years of independence, for both 
the Congress and the BJP, Christians and Muslims have become, in the words of George 
Orwell, “inconvenient minorities” in India.86 
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